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1 
THE PATH LESS TRAVELED:  
A NATURAL LAW CRITIQUE OF JUSTICE HOLMES’ 
PATH OF THE LAW 
Alexander Hamilton+ 
“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference.”1 
There are many paths one can follow in the law.  These paths can either be 
made or followed.  Here only two are examined: natural law jurisprudence, 
which is followed, and that of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., which was 
created.  Justice Holmes was a pioneer of American law, clearing the forest for 
generations of legal scholars, lawyers, and judges to come.  He is often heralded 
as the greatest American legal scholar, and he heavily influenced the legal 
realism movement and the course of American law.  Needless to say, Holmes’ 
influence could be felt throughout the twentieth century and is still felt even 
today. 
Holmes’ jurisprudence stands as a general representation of American law: 
the path that is most frequently taken.  However, there is another path—one 
rarely traveled—that really is different.  Natural law jurisprudence is a narrow 
path focused on the common good2 rather than an exaggerated individual 
liberty—which is why it is rarely taken.  In fact, the only reason that it is narrow 
is precisely because it is rarely taken, and rarely taken because it is 
misunderstood.  The phrase “natural law” is only ever heard in undergraduate 
philosophy courses via a passing mention of medieval ethics or in allegations of 
judicial activism3—and it certainly is never mentioned in the halls of a law 
school.  To say that natural law should be the guiding principle of law is 
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 1. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, POETRY FOUNDATION, 
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44272/the-road-not-taken (last visited June 13, 2020). 
 2. See discussion infra note 41. 
 3. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511–12 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“If these formulas based on ‘natural justice,’ or others which mean the same thing are to prevail, 
they require judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal 
of what laws are unwise or unnecessary.”). 
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anathema in academia and society.4  The few who do advocate it, however, seem 
to put forth distortions of natural law.5 
The purpose of this Comment is to advocate the necessity of natural law 
jurisprudence for a just society by critiquing Justice Holmes’ seminal work, The 
Path of the Law.6  This Comment argues, from the Thomistic natural law 
tradition, that Holmes is fundamentally wrong about separating law from 
morality and logic.  The three necessarily exist together—like the legs of a 
tripod—holding up society and government. 
This Comment will proceed as follows.  Section I provides a brief history of 
American jurisprudence.  Our country’s founders mostly ascribed to a derivation 
of natural law that was later overshadowed by the efforts of Justice Holmes and 
the Legal Realists.  Section II lays out Holmes’ argument in The Path of the Law 
and St. Thomas Aquinas’ formulation of natural law in his Summa Theologiae.  
Section III critiques Holmes’ jurisprudence as found in The Path of the Law 
using St. Thomas’ thought.  This Comment will attempt to show why choosing 
one path over the other makes a crucial difference.  Section IV concludes by 
                                                 
 4. For an insightful article detailing the debate between Legal Realism and Catholic Legal 
Thought in the twentieth century see John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, The Forgotten Jurisprudential 
Debate: Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1203 (2015).  
Breen and Strang offer a few explanations for why Catholic jurists’ exposition of natural law did 
not make a foothold in American jurisprudence: natural lawyers were discredited and ignored by 
scholars and historians; natural law is met with an ingrained skepticism; scholars view natural law 
as synonymous with theology; and American society and academic culture have strong currents of 
anti-Catholicism.  Id. at 1257–1311. 
 5. There seem to be three modes of belief about the natural law.  The first views natural law 
as a vehicle through which morality is forced on an unwilling people.  The second, from St. Thomas 
Aquinas, understands natural law as the rightly ordered nature of human beings created by God.  
For further discussion of this second mode see infra Section I.B of this Comment.  The third view, 
espoused by New Natural Law Theorists, says that natural law is a system of morality created by 
the human intellect to provide a moral consensus between theists and nontheists, with no reference 
needed to the existence of God.  For example, John Finnis sees natural law as a “set of basic 
practical principles” that everyone uses to acquire certain goods in life.  JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL 
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (1980).  In other words, natural law is simply a rulebook that 
humans create to help them achieve a happy life.  Finnis misread Aquinas when he stated, “for 
Aquinas, the way to discover what is morally right (virtue) and wrong (vice) is to ask, not what is 
in accordance with human nature, but what is reasonable.”  Id. at 36.  Finnis creates a false 
dichotomy.  St. Thomas would characterize acting reasonably and acting in accordance with human 
nature as the same thing.  2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, q.94, art. 2, at 1009 
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1952) (“[A]ll those 
things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, 
and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance.”).  Our 
human nature can reveal to our reason what is good and, in turn, our reason can help us align our 
actions with our human nature.  Finnis also constructs his theory of natural law “without needing 
to advert to the question of God’s existence or nature or will.”  FINNIS, supra note 5, at 49.  See 
Section I.B for a discussion of why natural law can only be understood in the context of God’s 
existence. 
 6. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
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making the case that it is necessary to emphasize jurisprudence in law and legal 
education. 
I.  ROOTS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
There is a trend in modern jurisprudence to justify the use of natural law in 
America by claiming that the Founding Fathers wrote it into the Constitution.7  
It is evident that many founders followed John Locke’s concept of natural rights, 
as distinguished from the Thomistic understanding of natural law.8  Locke’s idea 
that men retained certain spheres of action that were impenetrable from 
government interference was common throughout the founding generation and 
found its way into the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights.9  
Lockean rights have been maintained in modern substantive due process theory 
as a means to preserve individual liberty from government intrusion.  However, 
any concept of natural law in American law declined sharply over the nineteenth 
century.10 
Justice Holmes and the Legal Realist movement had just as much—if not 
more—of a lasting effect on American law than did natural rights theory.11  No 
American jurist is more acclaimed than Justice Holmes for his contributions to 
jurisprudence and free speech doctrine, among other accomplishments.12  
                                                 
 7. Many conservatives today who want to see a revival of traditional morals in American 
society via law will argue not only that morality can be legislated, but also that such morality was 
engrained into the American political system.  These efforts ultimately fail, however, because the 
formulation of natural law tied to the Founding is Lockean and therefore rests on the shifting sands 
of the social compact.  See Robert P. George, Colloquium Natural Law: Colloquium Natural Law, 
the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2282 
(2001); Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas, 
9 REGENT U.L. REV. 33, 44–47 (1997); Michael H. Hoffheimer, Copying Constitutional Text: 
Natural Law, Constitutionalism, Authority, 4 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 654, 658–59 (1996) 
(understanding natural law as Lockean theory to create natural rights and a functioning 
government); Brendan F. Brown, Natural Law and the Law-Making Function in American 
Jurisprudence, 15 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 9, 23 (1939). 
 8. Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1217; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 44–47.  Brendan Brown 
argued that natural law was a phrase used to protect perceived individual rights and beckon social 
and legal reform, bringing scorn on the phrase “natural law” in American jurisprudence.  Brown, 
supra note 7, at 14 (“[N]atural law was sometimes viewed as a specification of moral rights, which 
supported legal rights without any corresponding legal duties.”). 
 9. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 46–47. 
 10. Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1217–18. 
 11. See Patrick Glen, Student Article, Why Plessy/Brown and Bowers/Lawrence are Correct: 
Thomistic Natural Law as the Content of a Moral Constitutional Interpretation, 31 OHIO N.U.L. 
REV. 75, 77–80 (2005) (arguing that Holmes himself contributed to the decline of natural law in 
America). 
 12. See John M. Kang, Prove Yourselves: Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Obsessions of 
Manliness, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 1069 (2016) (arguing that Holmes’ greatest influence was the virtue 
of courage); Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1220–21. 
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Holmes espoused ideas that laid the groundwork for legal realism,13 an 
amorphous legal theory that swept the legal field in America in the 1920s and 
1930s.14  Although it did not formally survive World War II,15 many of its tenets 
are still held today.  To understand modern American law, one must first know 
its architects. 
A.  Holmes and Legal Realism 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., fought in the Civil War,16 graduated and taught 
at Harvard Law School, and sat as an Associate Justice on both the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Supreme Court of the United 
States.17  During his long career, Holmes gave speeches and wrote judicial 
opinions that have become part of the canon of American law.  His influence on 
American law is unanimously acknowledged.18  Walter Kennedy wrote of 
Holmes: “Reverting to his philosophical papers, it is clear that dominant traits 
of Holmes’ character were skepticism, cynicism of eternal values, dismissal of 
natural law and abhorrence of principles.”19  Holmes lobbied relentlessly for 
                                                 
 13. Rodger D. Citron, The Nuremberg Trials and American Jurisprudence: The Decline of 
Legal Realism, the Revival of Natural Law, and the Development of Legal Process Theory, 2006 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 385, 387, 389–90 (2006) (discussing the decline of Legal Realism after WWII 
due to totalitarian regimes’ use of separating law from morality).  See also Walter B. Kennedy, A 
Review of Legal Realism, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 362, 364 (1940) (naming Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., the “father of real realism”). 
 14. Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1219–20; Citron, supra note 13, at 386. 
 15. Citron, supra note 13, at 387. 
 16. See David J. Seipp, 125th Anniversary Essay, Holmes’s Path, 77 B.U. L. REV. 515, 518 
(1997) (describing the various influences and circumstances surrounding Justice Holmes’ most 
famous speech, including his experience fighting in the Civil War). 
 17. Kang, supra note 12, at 1099; Seipp, supra note 16, at 519. 
 18. James W. Springer, Natural Selection or Natural Law: A Reconsideration of the 
Jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 53–55 (2005) (describing 
Holmes’ rejection of natural law and subsequent advocating of evolutionary theory); Seipp, supra 
note 16, at 516. 
 19. Walter B. Kennedy, Portrait of the New Supreme Court, 13 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 9 (1944) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s new trend of ignoring precedent).  At first glance, these principles 
of Holmes’ character don’t seem to translate into American law, but upon further observation, one 
can see their prevalence.  The Supreme Court has shown much skepticism regarding the value of 
religion in the public sphere, especially in primary and secondary education.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 594, 597 (1992).  The Supreme Court displayed its skepticism in Lee by noting: 
Assuming, as we must, that the prayers were offensive to the student and the parent who 
now object, the intrusion was both real and, in the context of a secondary school, a 
violation of the objectors’ rights . . . [T]he state-imposed character of an invocation and 
benediction by clergy selected by the school combine to make the prayer a state-
sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was left with no alternative but to 
submit. 
Id.  For another example of such skepticism in education, see Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (finding a violation of the Establishment Clause when states 
“require[ed] the selection and reading at the opening of the school day from verses of the Holy 
Bible and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer”).  Likewise, the codification of the sexual revolution 
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lawyers and judges to view the law as separate from morality and logic.20  He 
believed that law amounted to how judges decided cases and hoped that they 
would look to sociology and economics to guide their rulings instead of being 
bound to mere tradition.21 
Legal realism arose in the 1920s and 1930s as a response to legal formalism.22  
Legal Realists critiqued the prevailing method of scientifically applying the law, 
which they pejoratively called “legal formalism.”23  Although there was no 
formal school of legal realism, the Realists had several common beliefs.24  They 
confessed a distrust of and skepticism about the neutrality of judges applying 
law, emphasized the importance of science and sociology in deciding cases, 
                                                 
by Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Obergefell v. Hodges demonstrate the Supreme 
Court’s cynicism of eternal values of morality: 
Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent 
and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are 
disparaged here.  But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and 
public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on 
an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.  
Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as 
opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood 
to deny them this right. 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).  See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 
159 (1973) (discussing a woman’s “right of privacy” in deciding whether to “terminate her 
pregnancy” and refusing to “resolve the difficult question of when life begins”); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is 
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).  Finally, the Supreme 
Court’s incessant use of substantive due process exercised via judicial activism shows an 
abhorrence of principles in favor of individual comprehensive doctrines.  See Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision had “no . . . basis in the 
Constitution” and rested “on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction that same-sex 
couples should be allowed to marry”). 
 20. Glen, supra note 11, at 99; Seipp, supra note 16, at 516.  To avoid the appearance of a 
straw man attack, this Comment acknowledges that Holmes attempted to clarify his idea as a 
framework to learn the law by viewing it as separate from traditional notions of morality and logic, 
instead of outright claiming that the substance of law was separate from the two.  See Holmes, 
supra note 6, at 459, 465 (1897) (“When I emphasize the difference between law and morals I do 
so with reference to a single end, that of learning and understanding the law. . . .  The training of 
lawyers is a training in logic. . . .  The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of 
logic.”).  A close examination of Holmes’ propositions and their logical conclusions, however, 
reveals that his humility was mere rhetoric.  This Comment demonstrates in the discussion below 
that he had the utmost suspicion of the use of morality and logic in law. 
 21. Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1221. 
 22. Citron, supra note 13, at 386; Philip E. Hesch & Christopher J. Grabarek, Towards the 
Deconstruction of Legal Relativism, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 349, 360–62 (1994) (arguing that law 
should be grounded in an objective morality but presenting a natural law theory that is grounded in 
man’s reason, not God’s). 
 23. Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1224. 
 24. Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1223–24; Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About 
Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1235–38 (1931) (describing the 
common points of departure of the leading Legal Realist scholars of the time). 
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believed that law should adapt to a changing society, and argued that law should 
be considered as separate from normative morality.25 
To say that legal realism influenced American law would be a gross 
understatement.  Indeed, Walter Kennedy, writing in the 1940s, already 
attributed the change in Supreme Court handling of precedent to the influence 
of Holmes’ and other Realists’ skepticism and pragmatism in law.26  Law 
schools, attorneys, and judges began to take some of the precepts of legal realism 
to heart and practice as the twentieth century progressed.27  Law students today 
cannot escape the teachings of legal realism in the classroom, nor can lawyers 
avoid it in the courts.  However, some Catholic scholars groaned to wake up and 
find America realist. 
B.  Natural Law 
The history of natural law would be an odd concept to cover.  Rather, this 
brief discussion will highlight the history of the understanding of natural law.  
Immutability is the very nature of the natural law, so it would be silly to say that 
it has a history and imply that it changes.  Natural law connects all men 
throughout all time, for it binds them to the same obligations.  It is important to 
note, as this section will show, that natural law per se is not the same as natural 
law jurisprudence.  Natural law exists both as a binding moral order on humanity 
and a measure of human law.  Further distinctions will be made between natural 
law as it is and natural law as it has been misunderstood.  Modernity has tended 
to separate religion, law, and morality in society.  There is an urgent need to 
revive the understanding and practice of natural law in civilization.  Brendan 
Brown summarized this need: 
 Legists should explain more adequately the meaning of natural law 
and its multitudinous functions.  Perhaps this will necessitate the 
growth of a large group of jurists in this country who are sympathetic 
toward the restoration of the philosophy of natural law to its rightful 
place in the world of jurisprudence.  But whatever the cost in terms of 
effort, contemporary civilization will be amply repaid.  Indeed if 
natural law thinking continues in its present muddled state, so that it 
will play no decisive role in determining the future direction of the 
world hegemony of ideas, man will have betrayed his faculties.28 
                                                 
 25. Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1223–24; Hesch & Grabarek, supra note 22, at 360–62; 
Llewellyn, supra note 24, at 1236–37. 
 26. Kennedy, supra note 19, at 8–12. 
 27. Marin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in the Post-Realist 
Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353, 354–59 (2008) (describing the decline of debate over the Legal 
Realist movement). 
 28. Brown, supra note 7, at 18. 
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So long as the most popular natural law thinkers, such as John Finnis, preach 
a false understanding of natural law, society will not be healed of its ailments.29  
Only a few scattered Catholic scholars seem to hold the natural law in its true 
form, like the faithful remnant scattered abroad.  Miriam Rooney stated the 
problem succinctly over 60 years ago: “Unfortunately there has been nowhere 
nearly enough written as yet to inform honest inquirers on any side as to what 
the natural law can offer toward the solution of contemporary legal problems.”30  
To do this great work of engaging modernity, there must be a grasp of what 
natural law is.  Any work in natural law jurisprudence must be grounded in the 
work of St. Thomas Aquinas—the authority on natural law because he was the 
most learned of all the writers who came before him and wrote precisely and 
intelligibly in general terms so as to cover the most ground.31  We now examine 
the various understandings of natural law and why St. Thomas is its exponent 
par excellence. 
The earliest articulations of natural law can be found in the most prominent 
Greek and Roman philosophers, Aristotle and Cicero.32  Cicero explained 
natural law as “right reason in harmony with nature[,]” an eternal measure of 
human action at all times and in all places.33  The natural law is also mentioned 
in Emperor Justinian’s Corpus Iurus Civilis as the very foundation of the legal 
code.34  The last group to work on the natural law before St. Thomas was the 
medieval canonists, most notably Gratian, who preceded St. Thomas in 
declaring that the natural law was given by God to man as a rule and measure of 
his actions.35 
St. Thomas Aquinas was born in the year 1225 A.D. to minor noble parents.36  
Upon reaching maturity, he entered the Order of Preachers and lived his life as 
                                                 
 29. See Miriam T. Rooney, The Philosophy of Natural Law of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2 CATH. 
LAW. 22, 24 (1956).  Rooney commented on this issue among natural law scholars: 
Not only jurists and philosophers, but conquerors and revolutionaries, have sought 
justification for their activities in the name of the natural law.  Is it fair to assume that all 
are talking about the same thing?  If so, how can the disparities be reconciled and the 
confusion dispelled?  It may well be that many of those who talk about the natural law, 
like those who call out, “Lord, Lord,” will not ultimately be found among the elect. 
Id. 
 30. Id. at 23. 
 31. Id. at 25. 
 32. Brown, supra note 7, at 9; Glen, supra note 11, at 76; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 41–42.  
See also CHARLES P. NEMETH, AQUINAS IN THE COURTROOM 6–9 (2001) (discussing the influence 
of Aristotle and Cicero on St. Thomas’ legal thought). 
 33. Glen, supra note 11, at 83 (quoting MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE REPUBLIC 68–69 
(Niall Rudd trans., Jonathan Powell & Niall Rudd eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)). 
 34. Id. at 82–83. 
 35. Id. at 86–87; see also NEMETH, supra note 32, at 12 (discussing the influence of Gratian 
on St. Thomas’ legal thought). 
 36. Ralph McInerny & John O’Callaghan, Saint Thomas Aquinas, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 23, 2014) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/. 
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a Dominican friar.37  St. Thomas spent most of his life praying, teaching, and 
writing at the University of Paris.38  His tour de force, the Summa Theologiae, 
sought to bring all that was good in theology and philosophy together.39  Pulling 
from Christian and pagan sources alike, the Summa was St. Thomas’ attempt to 
explain the relationship between God and His creation.40  The Treatise on Law 
is nestled in the part of the Summa treating man’s duties to God.  It is important 
to note that St. Thomas’ discussion on law is part of a greater work on morality.  
While he did not see them as synonymous, he saw them as playing off of each 
other. 
St. Thomas began his Treatise on Law in the Aristotelian tradition of making 
distinctions.  Law, in the Thomistic tradition, is “an ordinance of reason for the 
common good, made by him who has care of the community, and 
promulgated.”41  All four factors must be present for a law to be valid.  St. 
Thomas uses these factors to distinguish between just and unjust laws.42  If a 
                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. (noting that Saint Thomas Aquinas’ most famous work, the Summa Theologiae, is 
most often cited by modern day philosophers as Saint Thomas Aquinas’ view on the intersection 
of theology and philosophy). 
 40. See id. (noting that Saint Thomas Aquinas’ work in Summa Theologiae emphasizes that 
theological and philosophical discourse begin with what God has revealed about Himself and His 
Creation and knowledge of the world, respectively). 
 41. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.90, art. 4, at 995.  A proper understanding of what 
the common good is must be established in order to comprehend what the purpose of law is, and 
what the law is in general.  St. Thomas equated the act of being as good itself.  1 AQUINAS, supra 
note 5, pt. I-II, q.5, art. 1, at 23.  David Crawford articulated three competing uses of the phrase 
“common good” and explained that only one can give law its full effect and meaning.  David S. 
Crawford, Gay Marriage, Public Reason, and the Common Good, 41 COMMUNIO 380, 384–89 
(2014).  The first is a conception that the common good refers to the set of goods required for a 
healthy life—such as water, food, shelter, medicine, and infrastructure—however, this view fails 
because it lacks “commonness,” as the goods are for individual health and well-being.  Id. at 385–
87.  The second view focuses on the goodness of the individuals in a community; it also fails 
because it is not something held by the community, but only individually.  Id. at 387–88.  
Crawford’s final view, I think, exemplifies the Thomistic meaning of the “common good,” as not 
only the good things of a community or the good things done by the community, but is the 
community itself, including the relationship of the parts of a community to their whole.  Id. at 389–
90.  Combining the views of St. Thomas and Crawford, if the act of being is good, then the common 
good of a community is existing together, which includes proper relations between parts and the 
well-being of those parts.  In the context of law, then, to legislate for the common good is to pass 
laws that are conducive to the proper relationships of the parts of a community to other parts and 
to the whole. 
 42. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.96, art. 54, at 1020.  St. Thomas said the following: 
  On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being contrary to human 
good, through being opposed to the things mentioned above:—either in respect of the 
end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive not to 
the common good but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory;—or in respect of the 
author, as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to him;—or 
in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally on the community, 
although with a view to the common good.  The like are acts of violence rather than laws, 
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legislative act is not in accord with reason, is directed only toward a private 
good, is made by one without vested authority, or is enforced without notice, it 
fails as a law.43 
St. Thomas identified four types of law, three of which are briefly defined 
here.44  One can think of these three types of law as nesting dolls.  The largest 
and broadest is the eternal law, which is God’s “Divine Reason” governing the 
whole universe.45  That is, God (the creator and proper authority of the universe) 
prescribes all that is good by ordering the entire universe (an ordinance of reason 
for the common good).46 
The natural law is the “rational creature’s participation of the eternal law . . . 
.”47  In other words, natural law is the proper order of man’s actions in 
conformity with all God has ordained as good for man.  One can see how natural 
law fits nicely into eternal law like a nesting doll; natural law only governs 
humans, instead of the whole universe, and is entirely encompassed by eternal 
law.  Now, there is an important distinction to make here.  Natural law comes 
                                                 
because, as Augustine says, a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all.  Wherefore 
such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or 
disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, according to Matth. v. 
40, 41: If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever 
will force thee one mile, go with him other two. 
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good: such are the 
laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: and 
laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as stated in Acts v. 29, we ought to 
obey God rather than men. 
Id. 
 43. Id.; see also RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL 
LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 108–12 (2007) (“[A] human ordinance can be unjust in three 
ways: ex fine, ‘laws’ ordained to a private good; ex auctore, ‘laws’ enacted by one who has usurped 
authority; ex forma, ‘laws’ that unjustly distribute benefits and burdens.”).  The fourth disqualifier, 
notice, is found in the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  U.S. CONST. 
amends. V, XIV. 
 44. See 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.91, arts. 1, 4, at 997–99; pt. I–II, q.93, art. 2, at 
1004–05.  The fourth, being the Divine law, pertains to positive decrees from God given by Divine 
revelation, i.e., Scripture.  Id. pt. I–II, q.91, art. 4, at 998.  St. Thomas also discussed the Old Law 
and New Law, deriving from the Old and New Testaments, respectively, which can be understood 
under Divine Law.  Id. pt. I–II, q.91, art. 5, at 999. 
 45. Id. pt. I–II, q.91, art. 1, at 996; see also Glen, supra note 11, at 88 (“[T]he world is 
governed by divine Providence, and since the world is so governed, it is subject to and regulated 
by the Eternal Law.”). 
 46. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.91, art. 1, at 996.  Notice of the eternal law is hard to 
comprehend.  Id. pt. I–II, q.91, art. 4, at 998–99; pt. I–II, q.93, art. 2, at 1004–05; see also Rooney, 
supra note 29, at 27 (“However, human knowledge of eternal law cannot be other than imperfect, 
since each person’s knowledge of it is limited according to his own capacity.  Furthermore, he can 
know it, not as it is in itself, but only in its effects.  For these reasons, no person can judge of eternal 
law.”). 
 47. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I-II, q.91, art. 2, at 997. 
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from God, and not from man.48  The cardinal sin of new natural law theorists is 
basing their formulations of natural law on an act of reason by man and not 
God.49  So, to define natural law under the definition of law given above, natural 
law is an ordinance of God’s reason on how men ought to act for the common 
good of mankind.50 
Now, the most common and most important objection arises: how do we know 
what natural law says?51  New natural law theorists have shifted the foundations 
of natural law to avoid the tough answer.  If we claim that natural law comes 
from God, citizens of our liberal republic will object that any moral or legal order 
that comes from it will be unsuitable to govern anyone of a different religious 
profession.  New natural law theorists have reduced natural law to a common 
denominator of moral prescriptions to which everyone can agree, regardless of 
creed.  If we shift this foundation, natural law loses its very authority and 
becomes a mere human moral code.52  The United States was the first experiment 
                                                 
 48. See Brown, supra note 7, at 9 (“Thomas Aquinas subdivided the category jus naturale 
into the lex aeterna or the reason of the divine wisdom governing the whole universe, and the lex 
naturalis or the law of human nature which proceeded ultimately from God but immediately from 
human reason in which it was mirrored.”); HITTINGER, supra note 43, at 97 (“The law is called 
natural according to the mode of promulgation and reception, not the pedigree of legislation.”). 
 49. For examples of rationalistic or new natural law theory, see FINNIS, supra, note 5, at 23; 
George, supra note 7 at 2275–76; Hesch & Grabarek, supra note 22, at 350, n.4; Hoffheimer, supra 
note 7, at 659; Santiago Legarre, A New Natural Law Reading of the Constitution, 78 LA. L. REV. 
877, 881–82 (2018). 
 50. Notice of natural law is more apparent than that of eternal law.  2 AQUINAS, supra note 
5, pt. I–II, q.94, art. 4, at 1011; pt. I–II, q.94, art. 6, at 1013 (“[T]here belong to the natural law, 
first, certain most common precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and 
more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles.”).  
We are given notice of natural law because it is imprinted on us by God.  Id. pt. I–II, q.94, art. 6, at 
1012.  However, knowledge of the natural law has been tainted.  Id. pt. I–II, q.94, art. 6, at 1013 
(commenting that “the natural law” can be “blotted out” by “concupiscence or some other passion,” 
“evil persuasion[,]” or “viscous customs and corrupt habits”).  In His charity, God revealed the 
natural law in Divine law too so that no one would misunderstand His precepts.  Id. pt. I–II, q.91, 
art. 4, at 998–99.  See also Rooney, supra note 29, at 27–28 (“Human beings are moved to act in 
accordance with eternal law, first of all through being so inclined or disposed as other creatures are, 
but they are also moved to act by knowledge and understanding of the Divine commandment.”). 
 51. I would be remiss to not mention that Justice Holmes wrote a short piece summarizing his 
own views on natural law.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41–43 
(1918) (objecting to natural law because it cannot be known outside of personal experience and 
stating “[t]he jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naive state of mind that 
accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must 
be accepted by all men everywhere”).  For Holmes, natural law is a mere subjective belief—
”determined largely by early associations and temperament, coupled with the desire to have an 
absolute guide”— about what people ought to do, amounting to a social contract of prescribed and 
proscribed actions to preserve one’s life.  Id. at 42–3.  Justice Holmes could not grasp natural law 
because his intellect could not get off the ground and make the first step of grasping an intelligible 
reality, denying a connection between nature and morality.  This inability to learn from human 
nature predisposed him to disbelieve in a natural law that was universally binding. 
 52. The legal maxim nemo iudex in sua causa (no man shall judge his own case) is guiding 
here.  If a person sits to judge his own case, there is a guarantee of bias in the judgment, or at least 
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of this ideology on a large scale.  Instead of founding government on the 
authority of God,53 the United States was founded on the sole authority of the 
people.54  Any legislation pertaining to morals nowadays must be met with an 
approval of the majority, if it is even allowed.  But this leads to an arbitrary 
power struggle, or a “might makes right” jurisprudence.55  An arbitrary will 
cannot be the basis of law or morality.  Therefore, God must remain in the picture 
when discussing natural law to retain its binding force on all people.56 
Human law is the last type of law to consider.  At first, it appears that human 
law would be something that everyone could define together, but its distinctions 
have caused the most furious debates in Western civilization.  St. Thomas takes 
                                                 
the sense of impropriety that would delegitimize the judgment, since no one would give themselves 
an unfavorable decision.  The maxim applies equally to natural law as it does to human law: man 
cannot form a system for his own morality, for his passions and biases would lead him astray 
towards a self-serving moral code.  See Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The 
Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 386, 390–92 (2012) (describing the history of the maxim 
in American jurisprudence). 
 53. St. Paul stated in his Epistle to the Romans: “Let every soul be subject to higher powers: 
for there is no power but from God: and those that are, are ordained of God.  Therefore, he that 
resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.  And they that resist, purchase to themselves 
damnation.”  Romans 13:1–2 (Douay Rheims).  St. Paul says that God is the very origin of 
government.  Temporal rulers only govern by the permission of God, so to deny this divine origin 
of authority sets the leviathan loose. 
 54. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.  Pope Leo XIII proved the absurdity of this claim: 
Man’s natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling apart, 
provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure the means of 
developing his mental and moral faculties.  Hence, it is divinely ordained that he should 
lead his life-be it family, or civil-with his fellow men, amongst whom alone his several 
wants can be adequately supplied.  But, as no society can hold together unless some one 
be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good, every body politic must 
have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in 
nature, and has, consequently, God for its Author.  Hence, it follows that all public power 
must proceed from God. 
Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, LIBRERIA EDITRICE VATICANA, http://www.vatican.va/content/leo-
xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-dei.html (last visited June 14, 
2020).  Furthermore, St. Thomas quoted St. Augustine: “If the people have a sense of moderation 
and responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law 
allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of the commonwealth.”  
2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.97, art. 1, at 1022.  St. Thomas is not opposed to a republican 
form of government in principle, but he would never dispense with the biblical teaching of St. Paul 
that the authority of the civil government still rests in God. 
 55. Hesch & Grabarek, supra note 22, at 351 (“Absent a conceptual framework grounded in 
absolute presuppositions (i.e., a natural law), legal decisions, as well as moral and value judgments, 
are inevitably left to a political process that can only justify its outcomes by a ‘might makes right’ 
philosophy.”). 
 56. JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR 19–20 (1993). 
Only God can answer the question about the good, because he is the Good.  But God has 
already given an answer to this question: he did so by creating man and ordering him 
with wisdom and love to his final end, through the law which is inscribed in his heart (cf. 
Romans 2:15), the “natural law[.]” 
Id. 
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more time to discuss human law than eternal or natural law in the Summa.57  
Under this Comment’s working definition of law, human law is an ordinance of 
man’s reason, promulgated by the legislator for the common good of a state.58  
Most thoughtful Americans would agree with this statement, but St. Thomas 
goes deeper, arguing that human law must be rooted in natural law.  Now one 
can see the final nesting doll.  Both natural law and human law govern men’s 
actions.  Natural law is the eternal law inscribed in man, but there are two ways 
to make human law.  The first is by way of conclusion from the natural law.59  
St. Thomas gives the example that murder is outlawed as a conclusion from the 
natural law principle that no one should harm another.60  The second is by way 
of determination.61  Because the natural law often only gives man general 
principles of justice—such as criminals should be punished and society 
ordered—it is left to the legislator to decide just how to punish criminals or on 
which side of the road to drive.62 
There is one final point to make on human law.  It must be noted that the 
natural law will not be legislated wholesale by the state.  St. Thomas says that 
human law should not repress all vices because it would lay an impossible 
burden on men and frustrate the very purpose of law.63  To quote St. Thomas in 
full: 
 Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the 
majority of whom are not perfect in virtue.  Therefore human laws do 
not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more 
grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; 
and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition 
of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law 
prohibits murder, theft and such like.64 
The legislator has his work cut out for him—his job is to reason what should 
and should not be proscribed in forming a just society.  This plays into the 
purpose of law, discussed below.  Let it suffice now to say that the purpose of 
law is to make men good.65  Both natural law and human law are meant to order 
men’s actions toward their proper end: God. 
                                                 
 57. Human law has three whole questions in the Summa Theologiae devoted to it, while 
eternal law and natural law have one each.  2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.95–97, at 1013–
25. 
 58. Here I use the word legislator to signify the proper authority to enact legislation, be it a 
king, legislature, parliament, etc. 
 59. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.95, art. 2, at 1014–15. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. pt. I–II, q.96, art. 2, at 1018. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.92, art. 1, at 1001. 
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With the philosophical groundwork laid, this Comment can now move to 
consider Justice Holmes’ thoughts in The Path of the Law and juxtapose them 
with St. Thomas’ ideas on the same matters.  Finally, this Comment shall attempt 
to show that the premises, conclusions, and effects of Holmes’ jurisprudence do 
not lead to the justice which only natural law jurisprudence can provide. 
II.  HOLMES’ PATH OF THE LAW 
Justice Holmes first delivered The Path of the Law as a speech at the Boston 
University School of Law’s dedication ceremony for its new building on January 
8, 1897.66  His audience was comprised of law students, faculty, lawyers, and 
judges.67  This speech would soon become one of the most influential works in 
American jurisprudence.68  Holmes, with his characteristic rhetoric and flair, 
discussed the relationship between law, morality, and logic.  He was severely 
critical of traditional notions of law—something that defined his career.69  What 
follows is an analysis of Holmes’ chief arguments. 
The Path of the Law is loosely divided into two parts: the first dealing with 
the relationship between law and morality, and the second dealing with law and 
logic.70  Holmes began with his famous prediction theory.71  He said that the 
study of law amounts to nothing other than predicting what courts will do, 
because they decide how the law applies to people.72  Everything in law, even 
duties, only exists to explain what happens to the person who does not follow 
the law.73  Holmes derided “text writers” who say that law is a “system of reason, 
that it is a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, 
which may or may not coincide with the decision.”74  Any definition of law for 
Holmes deals only with how law is interpreted and applied, not how it is made.75 
Holmes used this prediction theory to explain why he thought law is separate 
from morals.  He argued that people obey the law in order to avoid punishments, 
not necessarily because it is the right thing to do.76  Holmes introduced his 
infamous “bad man” here: 
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good 
one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and 
                                                 
 66. Seipp, supra note 16, at 545–46.  The speech was later published in the Boston Law 
Magazine and Harvard Law Review.  Id. at 515–16; Holmes, supra note 6, at 457 n.1. 
 67. Seipp, supra note 16, at 547. 
 68. See id. at 516. 
 69. Id. at 517. 
 70. Id. at 516–17. 
 71. Id. at 516; Holmes, supra note 6, at 457. 
 72. Holmes, supra note 620, at 457. 
 73. Id. at 458. 
 74. Id. at 460. 
 75. Id. at 460–61 (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”). 
 76. Id. at 457–62. 
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therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction 
between morality and law.  A man who cares nothing for an ethical 
rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely 
nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, 
and will want to keep out of jail if he can.77 
The purpose of Holmes’ “bad man” is to understand the law because he is 
concerned about the law being convoluted with morals.78  While he conceded 
that “[t]he law is full of phraseology drawn from morals,” he did not want 
lawyers to “pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it.”79  For 
Holmes, morality concerned only a personal justification for action or inaction.80  
The law, on the other hand, is not made up of morally good or bad laws, but only 
enforceable ones.81  Justice Holmes did not much consider what can or should 
be law, but only what is enforced.82  A law can be valid even if just one wise 
man or all the people dislike it, or invalid despite broad support; whether or not 
a law is enforced is the only concern for Holmes in discovering what the law 
is.83 
Justice Holmes used several examples to explain his distinction.  First, he said 
that a taking by eminent domain is no different from a taking by wrongful 
conversion because both actors have to pay the full value for the property.84  The 
moral distinction between the acts is irrelevant because the consequences are the 
same.85  Second, Holmes said that a contract doesn’t so much create a duty to 
perform as much as it imposes a threat of damages in the case of 
nonperformance.86  Again, a contract creates no moral obligations, but only a 
legal liability. 
Holmes also attacked the confounding of legal language with moral language.  
His first example was the meaning of malice, which “in a moral sense” means 
                                                 
 77. Id. at 459. 
 78. Holmes, supra note 6, at 460 (“The law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and 
intent, and negligence, and so forth, and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more common in legal 
reasoning, than to take these words in their moral sense, at some stage of the argument, and so to 
drop into fallacy.”). 
 79. Id. at 459. 
 80. Id. at 460, 463 (“Morals deal with the actual internal state of the individual’s mind, what 
he actually intends.”). 
 81. Id. at 460. 
 82. Id. (“A statute in such a case would be empty words, not because it was wrong, but 
because it could not be enforced.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Holmes, supra note 6, at 461. 
 85. Id.  Justice Holmes elaborated: 
What significance is there in calling one taking right and another wrong from the point 
of view of the law?  It does not matter, so far as the given consequence, the compulsory 
payment, is concerned, whether the act to which it is attached is described in terms of 
praise or in terms of blame, or whether the law purports to prohibit it or to allow. 
Id. 
 86. Id. at 462. 
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“a malevolent motive[,]” but in the legal sense it only describes conduct that 
causes “temporal harm,” with no consideration of motive.87  The second 
example was the contract doctrine of the meeting of the minds.88  Holmes said 
that contracts can exist contrary to parties’ intentions because courts will enforce 
terms to which neither party agreed.89  Morality is an internal, personal matter—
not a controlling factor on law. 
The second half of The Path of the Law deals with the relationship between 
law and logic.  While Justice Holmes did not deny that logic is used in legal 
reasoning, he did deny that it is the definitive tool to reach truth.90  He stated his 
precise objection thusly: “The danger of which I speak is not the admission that 
the principles governing other phenomena also govern the law, but the notion 
that a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked out like mathematics from 
some general axioms of conduct.”91  Holmes’ skepticism about the use of logic 
came from a distrust of impartial judging.92  He wrote that logic can be used to 
justify any conclusion; the real force behind judgments are the “belief,” 
“opinion,” or “attitude” of a judge, which cannot be articulated but merely 
influence the position by which the judge then reasons.93  In other words, judges 
decide a case due to a certain bias, then use logic to justify their decision. 
Next, Justice Holmes talked briefly about the role of the judge.  Instead of 
using legal principles to deduce a decision mechanically, Holmes said that 
judges ought to consider the social advantage of such laws and decisions.94  By 
reviewing the social advantage of laws, judges can be more reflective on the 
biases that guide them and rule more honestly.95  Holmes then made an 
observation that seems to be reminiscent of our times as well: “[P]eople who no 
longer hope to control the legislatures . . . look to the courts as expounders of 
                                                 
 87. Id. at 463. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 464 (“In my opinion no one will understand the true theory of contract or be able 
even to discuss some fundamental questions intelligently until he has understood that all contracts 
are formal, that the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one 
intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs,—not on the parties’ having meant the 
same thing but on their having said the same thing.”). 
 90. Holmes, supra note 6, at 465–66. 
 91. Id. at 465 (“[J]udicial dissent often is blamed, as if it meant simply that one side or the 
other were not doing their sums right, and, if they would take more trouble, agreement inevitably 
would come.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 465–66. 
But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.  Behind the 
logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing 
legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the 
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.  You can give any conclusion a logical 
form. 
Id. 
 94. Id. at 467. 
 95. Holmes, supra note 620, at 467. 
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the Constitutions, and that in some courts new principles have been discovered 
outside the bodies of those instruments[.]”96  Here, Holmes predicted the now-
prevailing notion that courts can assert new rights when a claimant makes a 
compelling social claim to that right.97 
Finally, Justice Holmes discusses the relevance of history and tradition in law.  
Holmes seems more skeptical than usual here since he commits the entire second 
half of the lecture to this very topic.  He concedes that the “study of law is . . . 
the study of history[,]” but only insofar as it helps to critique and reform the 
law.98  Holmes is worried about a “blind imitation of the past,” of following a 
law for “no better reason than that our fathers have . . . .”99  Instead, Holmes says 
that lawyers ought to be well-versed in statistics and economics.100  The law is 
grounded in and changes due to its societal benefits.101 
III.  COMMENT 
To this point, this Comment has aimed to lay before the reader the thoughts 
of two great legal minds, and described the life, influence, and jurisprudence of 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and St. Thomas Aquinas.  St. Thomas was the 
great expounder of natural law par excellence, and Justice Holmes was the most 
influential, if not the most notable, American jurist.  This Comment will now 
proceed to expose the flaws in Justice Holmes’ jurisprudence as found in The 
Path of the Law via Thomistic natural law.  The first order of business will be to 
explain why law and morality are related by exposing the corruption in Holmes’ 
definition of law in his theories of prediction and the “bad man” through 
demonstrating why his theories and examples are wrong.  Secondly, this 
Comment will show that law necessarily pertains to reason.  Next, it will discuss 
the proper role of a judge.  Last, but certainly not least, it will explain that 
tradition and history are critical imports of law.  Throughout the analysis, this 
                                                 
 96. Id. at 467. 
 97. See HITTINGER, supra note 43, at 132 (“[C]itizens are encouraged to play a legal version 
of atomic warfare.  Partisan groups look to the courts to rewrite the fundamental law on their behalf 
. . . [V]ictory in a constitutional court wins the power to shape basic constitutional values . . . . 
Some rights are not supposed to be up for grabs.”). 
 98. Holmes, supra note 6, at 469.  Holmes continued: 
We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism, and must remember that for our 
purposes our only interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the present.  I look 
forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be 
very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the 
ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them. 
Id. at 474. 
 99. Id. at 468–69.  Here we get one of Holmes’ most famous aphorisms: “It is revolting to 
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”  Id. 
at 469. 
 100. Id. at 469 (“For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the 
present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.”). 
 101. Id. at 470–71. 
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Comment will set out the benefits of the natural law tradition and the harms of 
Holmes’ ideas. 
The first step is to clarify the definition of law.  Holmes’ definition would 
begin at the end of the path; law to him is only what a judge will do.102  This 
begs the question: How do judges or lawyers know what the law is before it is 
applied?  Holmes puts the cart before the horse despite charging traditional 
jurists with committing the same fallacy.103  The prediction theory often gets the 
law wrong.  Appellate and supreme courts exist for one reason: lower courts 
sometimes get the law wrong.  Relying solely on a judge’s exposition of the law 
is building one’s house on sand, for when the wind blows and the storm comes, 
the house falls.  The problem with Holmes’ theory of law is the same as the 
fallacy of pragmatism.  He asks what works in practice before asking what works 
in theory. 
Law must depend on immutable principles of justice, including its foundation.  
St. Thomas says that reason is the beginning of all action.104  A law cannot be 
made without an act of the legislator’s intellect.  St. Thomas gives his definition 
of law in a very Catholic way; the law begins at the moment of its conception.105  
Law, in the Thomistic tradition, can only come from the proper authority.106  In 
the United States, legislatures make law in accordance with constitutions.  A 
judge, by definition, decides particular cases before him or her, and has no 
competence to make law.  Judicial decisions depend on constitutions, statutes, 
and principles of law—and Holmes should, too. 
Further, the “bad man” theory is a faulty one because it misses the purpose of 
the law.  Holmes offered us this theoretical sinner to lure lawyers into thinking 
that law can only be understood as consequence.  This is a very narrow 
understanding of law.  St. Thomas not only said that law is made for the common 
good, but also that it forms the populace in virtue.107  Law must be understood 
in the good that it does.  Every law is enacted to order society and promote 
justice, be it by ordering traffic well or punishing criminals.  The purpose of the 
law that the “bad man” reluctantly obeys is to protect the people he would hurt—
and it has one other crucial purpose that Holmes completely ignored.108  When 
                                                 
 102. Id. at 457, 461. 
 103. Id. at 458. 
 104. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.90, art. 1, at 993. 
 105. Id. pt. I–II, q.91, art. 1, at 996. 
 106. Id. pt. I–II, q.90, art. 3, at 994–95. 
 107. Id. pt. I–II, q.90, art. 2, at 994; pt. I–II, q.92, art. 1, at 1001–02. 
 108. Once again, I wish to avoid attacking a straw man.  Holmes said the following: 
I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what I have to say as the 
language of cynicism.  The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life.  Its 
history is the history of the moral development of the race.  The practice of it, in spite of 
popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men. 
Holmes, supra note 6, at 459.  Once again, I think Holmes was misleading us and trying to dull the 
shock of his ideas.  In the same breath, Holmes said that law makes men good, but denies its effect 
on the bad man: 
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the “bad man” reluctantly obeys the law, his actions are rightly ordered.  In other 
words, he is forming good habits.109  Therefore, Holmes’ “bad man” is defeated 
by his own prudence in obeying law and becomes a good man.110 
The emphasis of Justice Holmes and the Legal Realists on separating law and 
morality was crucial in the development of law in the twentieth century.111  
Therefore, a response needs to be made to correct this false distinction.112  As 
stated above, St. Thomas placed his Treatise on Law within a greater work on 
morality.113  It was also noted in the immediately preceding paragraph that law 
is necessarily directed towards the common good and forms citizens in virtue.  
For legislators to act with the common good in mind is to act morally; to form 
laws with the object of making a just society is a very good and morally 
commendable thing to do.  Furthermore, that the very effect of laws is to 
habituate citizens to virtue demonstrates well how law is tied to morality.114 
Nevertheless, Holmes could still view this process of making laws for a just 
society and ordering people to obey them as a pragmatic exercise to make people 
get along, law being functional and not moral.  One final consideration will 
dispel this objection.  St. Thomas explains how acts of all the virtues and vices 
can be prescribed and proscribed, respectively.115  Law is ordered towards the 
common good, and therefore requires citizens to do certain good actions and 
refrain from certain bad ones.  The underlying problem is that Holmes personally 
                                                 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who 
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, 
not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside 
of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. 
Id. 
 109. See 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.92, art. 1, at 1001–02; see also MIRIAM THERESA 
ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW, AND SANCTION 122 (1937) (“Suffice it to say in regard to Mr. 
Justice Holmes, that in maintaining the notion of law as prediction, and in regarding it from the 
point of view of the bad man, he proposes a very impoverished and inadequate definition of law, 
which fails to consider its primary function of rule-making for the guidance of those who desire to 
abide by it.”). 
 110. St. Thomas said that all are subject to the law, but in a sense, only bad men are because 
their wills are not aligned to that of the lawgiver, whereas good men are not subject to, or threatened 
by, the law because their conduct conforms to it: 
[A] man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject to the coercer.  In this way 
the virtuous and the just are not subject to the law, but only the wicked.  Because coercion 
and violence are contrary to the will; but the will of the good is in harmony with the law, 
while the will of the wicked is discordant from it.  Therefore in this sense the good are 
not subject to the law, but only the wicked. 
2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.96, art. 5, at 1020–21. 
 111. Citron, supra note 13, at 386; Holmes, supra note 6, at 457–64; Kennedy, supra note 19, 
at 9–10. 
 112. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 48. 
 113. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 114. Defining morality is beyond the scope of this paper.  For a thorough discussion on 
morality per se, see 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.49–89, at 793–992 (Treatise on Habits). 
 115. Id., pt. I–II, q. 96, art. 2, at 1018. 
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denied any objective moral principles; while he would concede that laws force 
people to act or refrain from acting, he would never call such actions good or 
bad.116  To overcome Holmes’ prejudice, one must turn to his own examples and 
demonstrate that he is wrong on his own grounds.117 
Holmes claimed that law has no inherent need of a morality because a taking 
by eminent domain will have the same consequence as a taking by wrongful 
conversion with no possibility of restoration: the defendant must pay fair 
value.118  However, a distinction can be made.  A taking by eminent domain, an 
action of the state, entails no morally reprehensible conduct.  The state pays the 
original owner the fair value of the property because it is his due; the scales of 
justice require the balance.  A taking by conversion, on the other hand, is 
reprimanded both because it is due the plaintiff and the defendant must be 
chastised so as to form the habit of refraining from such a vice.  A similar 
argument can be made against Holmes’ coloring of contracts.119  A contract 
creates a duty towards another person.  When what is due is not given, the 
breaching party is reprimanded under law to castigate the vice of breaking 
promises and inculcate the virtue of performing duties. 
Holmes’ distinctions of certain legal words were likewise nonstarters.  He 
denied the very import of the word malice when it is an element of a crime, 
relegating malice to describe the action and not the intent.120  This separation of 
action and intention defies the very nature of human action.  As St. Thomas said, 
“Although the end is the last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order 
of the agent’s intention.”121  A person’s actions shed light on his intentions and 
vice versa.122  Therefore, a malicious act is evidence of a malicious will.  Holmes 
then denied any moral implications when referring to what a contract means.123  
However, he overlooked the possibility of a party’s bad intention being 
thwarted.  In Lucy v. Zehmer, a contract was enforced against a party who only 
                                                 
 116. Glen, supra note 11, at 79–80, 99; Kennedy, supra note 19, at 9–10. 
 117. G. K. Chesterton, in his insightful little book on St. Thomas Aquinas, cut to the heart of 
ideal philosophical debate while describing a debate by the saintly friar: 
It is no good to tell an atheist that he is an atheist; or to charge a denier of immortality 
with the infamy of denying it; or to imagine that one can force an opponent to admit he 
is wrong, by proving that he is wrong on somebody else’s principles, but not on his own.  
After the great example of St. Thomas . . . we must either not argue with a man at all, or 
we must argue on his grounds and not ours. 
G. K. CHESTERTON, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 56 (Dover ed., 2009). 
 118. Holmes, supra note 6, at 461. 
 119. See discussion supra Section II. 
 120. Holmes, supra note 6, at 463. 
 121. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.1, art. 1, at 610 (ST I–II q. 1 art. 1) (“Now man is 
master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as the faculty 
and will of reason.  Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a 
deliberate will.”). 
 122. Holmes defeated himself, however, because he later found a causal link between a judge’s 
intentions and the act of judging.  Holmes, supra note 6, at 465–66. 
 123. Id. at 463–64. 
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signed it as a joke.124  The law of contract reprimanded the defendant for 
misleading the plaintiff, a bad action that frustrated an honest transaction.  From 
these considerations, it is easy to conclude that law certainly has something to 
do with morality. 
Justice Holmes’ next error was his distrust of the use of logic in law.125  His 
skepticism drove him to believe that reason was only a mask for ulterior 
motives.126  But this very argument undermines itself because Holmes could 
have made this claim to justify one of his own ulterior motives, and so on his 
own ground he says that we should not trust him—especially because he was a 
sitting justice at the time.  St. Thomas said that law necessarily pertains to reason 
because reason is the proper origin of action; because laws govern actions, they 
must pertain to reason.127  The very definition of law in the Thomistic tradition 
requires the function of reason.128  Furthermore, Miriam Rooney points out the 
oddity that a “rationalist” like Holmes doesn’t appeal to people’s reason to obey 
reasonable laws.129 
Now to consider the role of the judge.  Holmes wished for judges to decide 
cases based on a decision’s social advantage.130  In other words, he thought that 
                                                 
 124. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954). 
 125. Holmes, supra note 6, at 465–66. 
 126. Kennedy, supra note 19, at 9. 
 127. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.90, art. 1, at 993. 
 128. Id. 
 129. ROONEY, supra note 109, at 134. 
He not only ignores the function of direction, guidance, and rule in the command part of 
law to the extent of making the secondary, contingent penalizing part, primary, but he 
also fails to make any appeal to the reason and intelligence of subjects of law, by devoting 
his whole attention to instincts, feelings, and the senses.  This is curious in a rationalist, 
but obviously inadequate in providing a satisfactory accounting for some very important 
psychological facts.  To it more than to anything else can be attributed the real breakdown 
of sanction, for free men will not be coerced into abiding by law which does not seem to 
them reasonable or just . . . . Any legal theory which fails to realize the importance of 
appealing to the intelligence in securing voluntary obedience to law, has within it the 
seeds of its own destruction. 
Id. 
 130. Holmes, supra note 620, at 467.  A discussion on the prudence of favoring social 
advantage in judicial decision making is out of the scope of this paper.  Miriam Rooney, in reference 
to Holmes’ jurisprudence, put the matter succinctly: 
To say that the function of law is to maintain the social welfare raises a question regarding 
the character that that welfare should have in view of the composition of society.  Society 
has no existence apart from the individuals who compose it.  It is as dependent upon them 
as they are upon it.  Consequently both must of necessity work together and neither can 
succeed otherwise.  This is a condition of existence.  When either element strives to 
advance at the expense of the other, the essential relationship is thrown out of order and 
conflict arises.  Human law was devised to maintain order and avoid conflict.  It does this 
by tending always toward justice—the rendering to every one of his own.  When it 
becomes subservient to a dominant power, whether that be one individual or a selective 
group which knows no law but force, it fails of attainment in the fundamental purpose of 
its existence and becomes a defective instrument, if not a wicked thing. 
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judges can alter what the law is.  This is a dangerous ideology.  Although 
otherwise known for his ideas on judicial restraint,131 Holmes allowed a judge 
to commit an act that would change the law.  If, under his own definition, law is 
only what judges will do, then as the social advantage of different statutes and 
cases changes, judges will unilaterally have to change the law.  This flies in the 
face of the very nature of the American system of checks and balances.  A judge, 
acting on his own perceived social advantage, violates due process: parties’ 
cases will not be decided based on the law, but rather on personal policy.  A 
judge, by nature, cannot and should not legislate.  St. Thomas stated the matter 
plainly: 
As the Philosopher says, “it is better that all things be regulated by 
law, than left to be decided by judges”: and this for three reasons.  
First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame 
right laws than to find the many who would be necessary to judge 
aright of each single case.—Secondly, because those who make laws 
consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on 
each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is 
easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into 
consideration, than by considering one solitary fact.—Thirdly, 
because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas 
those who sit in judgment judge of things present, towards which they 
are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity, wherefore their 
judgment is perverted.132 
Holmes was wrong to say that generalities do not determine concrete cases; 
concrete cases do not make generalities.133  It is the role of legislators to make 
the law because they can bring a vast array of considerations into the laws, 
including social advantage.  A judge, however, has a very limited tool kit.  When 
judges try to think outside of their box, it often leads to ruin. 
This then begs the question: what does a judge do when given a defunct law 
to apply?  Leaving the changing of law in the ordinary circumstance to the 
legislator is fine, but what if the legislature is acting too slowly and applying a 
certain law would produce an unjust result?  As a general rule, St. Thomas said 
that human law should not be changed unless the common good requires it.134  
Stable laws make a stable society.  When a change is in question, legislators 
must use their prudence.  If laws change too often, those who execute the law 
might not do so properly, but if laws grow stale, they will do more harm than 
good. 
                                                 
ROONEY, supra note 109, at 134–35. 
 131. See David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE 
L.J. 449, 453, 461 (1994) (arguing that Justice Holmes’ conception of judicial restraint was flawed). 
 132. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.95, art. 1, at 1014. 
 133. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“General 
propositions do not decide concrete cases.”). 
 134. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q. 97, art. 2, at 1023. 
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St. Thomas only laid out two possibilities for a law to change outside of the 
normal course of business, which is bicameralism and presentment in the United 
States.  First, he said that a person may act beside the letter of the law if an 
occasion arises “wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the 
general welfare.”135  Because legislators make broad laws, they will not fit the 
particulars of every case perfectly.136  St. Thomas stressed that this diversion 
from the rule is only to occur in cases of necessity; he gave the example of 
raising a city gate to let in retreating soldiers despite a law to keep the gates 
closed during a siege.137  The second way for a law to change in this way is for 
the lawgiver to grant a dispensation.138  When the application of a law would do 
evil or hinder good, but the case is not a matter of necessity, only the proper 
authority may provide the dispensation.139  Only the lawgiver can grant the 
dispensation in this situation because he has the authority to say what the law is.  
In this latter case, a judge could not dispense from such a law because he is not 
a lawgiver and does not have the authority to change the law.  In the even rarer 
case of an unjust law, St. Thomas required the judge not to rule according to the 
law and instead required him to remit the matter to the sovereign.140  Russell 
Hittinger puts the matter succinctly: “If the legislator cannot make unjust laws 
bind in conscience neither can the iudex.  And if the sentence of a judge is not 
binding, it is no sentence at all. That is to say, he has not judged as a judge.”141 
Lastly, this Comment must respond to Holmes’ distrust of tradition in law.  
His idea reeks of the utmost contempt for elders and ancestors.  It seems to stem 
from his bias against immutable moral principles.  Holmes believed that truth 
was only what the current majority said it was.142  In quoting Gratian, St. Thomas 
made the opposite claim: “It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should 
suffer those traditions to be changed which we have received from the fathers of 
old.”143  St. Thomas then went on to say that custom can obtain the force of 
                                                 
 135. Id. pt. I–II, q.96, art. 6, at 1021. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. pt. I–II, q.97, art. 4, at 1024–25. 
 139. Id. (“Consequently he who is placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a 
human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application to persons or 
circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed.”). 
 140. HITTINGER, supra note 43, at 107. 
 141. Id. at 109. 
 142. See Glen, supra note 11, at 77. 
 143. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.97, art. 2, at 1023.  The disrespect for tradition easily 
becomes a lack of faith in stare decisis: 
  The evil resulting from overruling earlier considered decisions must be evident.  In 
the present case, the court below naturally felt bound to follow and apply the law as 
clearly announced by this court.  If litigants and lower federal courts are not to do so, the 
law becomes not a chart to govern conduct but a game of chance; instead of settling rights 
and liabilities it unsettles them.  Counsel and parties will bring and prosecute actions in 
the teeth of the decisions that such actions are not maintainable on the not improbable 
chance that the asserted rule will be thrown overboard.  Defendants will not know 
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law.144  Because law can be promulgated by speech, so too can it be promulgated 
by actions.145  Therefore, we ought to give great deference to the laws and 
traditions of our forefathers, for their experience and wisdom far outweigh our 
own. 
Now to answer the reader’s inevitable question: What does Justice Holmes 
have to do with the law today?  This Comment has alluded to his influence 
several times.  The final task in this Comment is to demonstrate three things: 
Holmes’ living influence, its detriments, and how Thomistic natural law 
jurisprudence produces better results for society. 
Tracing Holmes’ influence and fully explaining why it is bad for our country 
and why Thomism is more conducive to justice and happiness is a task too large 
for the last few pages of this Comment.  It can, however, spur the conversation.  
It has been the case for quite some time that there is no philosophy in American 
law, meaning that there is no intentional philosophy.  The legal atmosphere in 
this country teems with political advocacy and agendas, but there is no 
philosophy in an academic sense.  While policies can be traced to differing 
philosophies, their direct causes are more often a perceived majoritarian belief.  
The Supreme Court never grounds decisions in the thought of St. Thomas, 
Nietzsche, or even Holmes, but how often do its members appeal to changing 
mores?  Pragmatic judicial decision-making based on the rule of the majority 
and social policy is precisely what Justice Holmes wanted.  The most sensational 
and serious fights in the law over the last fifty years have been over no-fault 
divorce, contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage—all related to family 
life.  The winners of these power-struggles have a shared philosophy with Justice 
Holmes.  The results have been anything but good for society.  America has seen 
a swift breakdown in family life.  Had these issues been decided by Thomistic 
natural law, the result would be a happier country. 
Every judge and lawyer remembers the casebook method from law school, 
and any law student is still suffering through it.  The casebook method involves 
reading court cases to learn the law.  Students become familiar with reading 
judicial opinions and how a point of law is applied to a set of facts.  Although 
the method precedes Holmes, it is a direct application of the prediction theory.146  
                                                 
whether to litigate or to settle for they will have no assurance that a declared rule will be 
followed.  But the more deplorable consequence will inevitably be that the administration 
of justice will fall into disrepute.  Respect for tribunals must fall when the bar and the 
public come to understand that nothing that has been said in prior adjudication has force 
in a current controversy. 
Kennedy, supra note 19, at 5 (quoting Mahnich v. S.S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 112–13 (1944) (Roberts, 
J., dissenting)). 
 144. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I–II, q.97, art. 2, at 1023. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Gary D. Finley, Note, Landgell and the Leviathan: Improving the First-Year Law 
School Curriculum by Incorporating Moby-Dick, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 162–64, 168–69 
(2011) (describing the history of Dean Langdell first implementing the casebook method at Harvard 
Law School in the late 19th century). 
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Law students and lawyers tend to focus on what a judge will do in fact, rather 
than what law is.  One should only study how the law is applied after one has 
studied what the law is and ought to be.  While reading judicial opinions has 
great educational merit, law students first need to learn the principles that should 
guide the law and on what the law itself is judged.  It is rare for a Jurisprudence 
class to be offered at a law school, let alone required.  The only class that 
discusses standards for law, Constitutional Law, is a mere recitation of Supreme 
Court opinions.  The law as it stands in the United States lacks a rigorous 
philosophical examination, and Holmes’ pragmatic approach of predicting how 
a case will resolve rules the day.  The casebook method is a single example of 
Justice Holmes’ influence on American law.  The upside down view of the 
casebook method is consonant with Holmes’ distrust of logic in law.  St. 
Thomas’ exposition of natural law provides a different way, one that encourages 
people and lawmakers to create just laws and expects judges to abide by the law 
and set legal maxims, instead of leaving the last word on the law to a few 
justices. 
The detriments and cures of Holmes’ philosophy cannot be discussed until 
more foundational issues are addressed.  In The Forgotten Jurisprudential 
Debate: Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism, John M. Breen 
and Lee J. Strang analyzed the twentieth century debate between natural lawyers 
and Legal Realists.147  From the 1920s to the 1940s, the two groups produced 
many writings explaining their respective jurisprudences, including critiquing 
one another.148  Natural lawyers, composed of Catholic legal scholars, argued 
the following: 
(1) the natural law—the basis of positive law—is neutral and 
independent; (2) the positive law should be judged based on its 
correspondence, or lack thereof, to the natural law; (3) the current 
American legal system, though flawed, was fundamentally sound; (4) 
although the law is not fully determinate, it is significantly so; and (5) 
judges should utilize natural law norms and prudence to decide, or as 
aids in deciding, underdetermined cases.149 
Legal Realists, however, made little to no effort to respond to these charges.150  
Catholic scholars were only able to publish their works in Catholic law school 
journals, while the Realists had prestigious, widely circulated journals in which 
to publish.151  During an academic dialogue, Walter Kennedy, a natural law 
scholar at Fordham, and Felix Cohen, a Legal Realist at Columbia, exchanged 
several articles published in their respective journals.152  However, Cohen was 
                                                 
 147. Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1207–08. 
 148. Id. at 1217–56. 
 149. Id. at 1243. 
 150. Id. at 1251. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1251–52. 
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able to publish his articles in both schools’ journals, while Columbia rejected 
Kennedy’s articles, giving his responses a smaller circulation in a less 
prestigious Catholic law journal.153  Legal Realists did not take natural law to be 
a worthwhile legal philosophy, so they did not spend their energy responding to 
it.154 
The American legal field is no more receptive to natural law today than it was 
eighty years ago.  Justice Holmes’ separation of law from morality and logic 
persists.  There is a philosophical gulf that predisposes antagonism to the natural 
law that must be filled before Holmes’ ideas can be properly remedied.  In 
discussing the rejection of natural law scholarship in both American law and 
historical treatises on American jurisprudence, Breen and Strang provided three 
reasons for the animus against natural law in America: “(1) skepticism 
concerning natural law; (2) the confounding of natural law and religion; and (3) 
secularism and anti-Catholicism in American society and academic culture.”155 
Modernity is predisposed to disbelieve natural law because it rejects objective 
values.  American legal scholars—and academia in general—have rejected a 
teleological perspective of human nature in favor of ethical relativism.156  In 
other words, there is no objective value system of human behavior based on 
human reason’s knowledge of nature; one cannot derive what ought to be from 
what is.157  Because natural law is the marriage of reason and nature, it is 
automatically discredited as “pre-scientific” by modern legal scholars, closing 
off any potential debate.158 
A hallmark of American law and society is the separation of church and state.  
Unfortunately, this doctrine is often interpreted as precluding religious beliefs 
from being codified.  Religious pluralism in law means no religion in law.  
Another reason for the rejection of natural law in American law is that natural 
law is conflated as Catholic theology.159  Academia usually views religious 
beliefs as “personal . . . subjective . . . and irrational.”160  To quote Breen and 
Strang: “Because the religious character of an idea is thought to disqualify it 
from consideration as a basis for law, the coupling of natural law with religion 
is a convenient way in which to dismiss a lengthy tradition of thought and 
inquiry with little effort.”161  Until American society and academia can see 
religion as a rational intellectual pursuit, natural law will continue to be regarded 
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as a religious tenet that cannot be codified and imposed on a religiously 
pluralistic society.162 
Finally, Breen and Strang forcefully pointed out that “anti-Catholicism is 
deeply rooted in the history of the nation.”163  The United States was dominated 
by a Protestant culture before it was transformed into a secular one.164  Both 
Protestantism and secularism are fundamentally opposed to Catholicism, and 
this antagonism has appeared in the form of social prejudice and legal bias 
throughout this country’s history.165  Breen and Strang said that anti-Catholic 
bias is “concerned with the ideas associated with traditional Catholic moral 
teaching, especially as these ideas may influence both law and social 
practice.”166  A distrust of the Catholic worldview is a nonstarter.  There is a 
great need for Catholic intellectuals in all fields of society to boldly proclaim the 
beauty of the Catholic tradition and the good it can offer to society.  Catholics 
must have a seat at the proverbial community and academic tables before they 
can effectively teach others about natural law. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
By now, the reader should have a firm grasp on the main tenets of Justice 
Holmes’ jurisprudence and Thomistic natural law.  The reader should also see 
that the two are fundamentally opposed to one another.  Justice Holmes was only 
influential because of his powerful rhetoric and progressive ideas.  His 
jurisprudence justified the alienation of morality from American law.  Once a 
people’s laws do not discriminate between virtues and vices, it doesn’t take long 
for the people to follow.  Natural law—in the Thomistic tradition—understands 
human nature, and is therefore capable of framing a proper foundation for laws 
conducive to human flourishing.  Justice is obtained by following the natural 
law, not by majoritarian rule. 
                                                 
 162. At this point, the reader might object that natural law must be inherently religious because 
this Comment argued that natural law can only be properly understood as being rooted in God’s 
reason.  Breen and Strang dispel this objection: 
It is worth noting, moreover, that such a capacious understanding of “religion” would not 
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Id. at 1280. 
 163. Id. at 1282. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Breen & Strang, supra note 4, at 1282–1310. 
 166. Id. at 1298.  Breen and Strang further explained: 
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This Comment hopes to revive a serious consideration of Thomistic natural 
law in American law.  Catholic judges, lawyers, and scholars need to embrace 
their intellectual heritage by synthesizing American law and natural law in 
scholarship and other materials.  Catholic law schools, in particular, have a duty 
to lead this revival in producing natural law scholarship and teaching the next 
generation of lawyers the natural law.  This Comment also hopes the Catholic 
University Law Review will regain its purpose, expounded by its founder Dean 
Brendan Brown in 1950, “not [to] be just another periodical, but rather the voice 
of The School of Natural Law Jurisprudence in America, scientifically and 
systematically appraising and evaluating current trends in the legal ordering of 
the United States.”167 
  
                                                 
 167. Brendan F. Brown, Foreword, 1 CATH. U. L. REV. xiv (1951).  Dean Brown also said that 
a “major aim of the Review will be to combat secularism in the law.”  Id. 
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